I've always been scared of the idea that there is another consciousness sitting in my body, unable to interface with the moving parts but always silently feeling everything I feel and observing everything I do. The source of that fear has, in all honesty, been the fear of judgement from a being that has been through all the same stuff I've been through but who would still dislike me, not from the feeling of empathy for such a being.
With all that I know now, do I think something like that is actually happening? Sorta? I'm not going to pretend to know what physical processes give rise to what qualia, although I'm leaning towards the opinion that if physical processes give rise to qualia at all then probably all physical processes give rise to all possible qualia. More accurately, I'm of the opinion that if we assume that computational processes give rise to qualia, and we assume that physical processes give rise to qualia by means of embodying computational processes, then all physical processes give rise to all possible qualia due to the subjectivity/dependence on the method of observation of which physical process corresponds to which computational process.
But that's a non-answer - "there's a silently judging copy of me in my body, but only in the sense that there's a silently judging copy of me in my thermostat" doesn't have the same ring to it.
Something a bit more meaningful is that while all conscious experiences provably have analogous physical processes they can be traced back to, there's no guarantee that a unique conscious experience corresponds to for such a physical process, even if we fix our mapping of which computational process corresponds to which physical process to something conventional.
You go into a room that records the state of matter in your body and the surroundings. A voice asks you to think of a color and write it down on a piece of paper. You think for a second. Then you write down "black". You exit the room, and the friendly room operator replays a simulation of the interaction of matter in the room in the duration of you being there. Even given a fixed mapping of what computational process corresponds to the physical process (real or simulated), you can't say for sure that there's only one possible sequence of experienced being experienced by the simulated you, identical to the one experienced by the real you. Really, any such sequence could be realistic, so long as it ends with you deciding to write "black" on the piece of paper.
Okay, not really. We can choose to limit our set of possible sequences of experience by more criteria than just "black" appearing on the piece of paper. Would the sequence result in the exact same patterns breathing and muscle-twitching as the original? We can go even deeper, since the room had very high resolution. Would the parts of the sequence of experiences corresponding to one part of the brain have the exact same interaction, movement of atom by movement of atom, to the other part of the brain as what happened with the original?
You can go further down, but the catch is, you can't do it by an infinite amount. At some point you run out of mutual information, and the difference in the physical state can't possibly correspond to the difference in experience. And at that point, you still have an infinite set of possible experience sequences that could account for all the aspects of the physical processes above this level.
But what about you? In the end you're stuck with the qualia you're stuck with. You can't switch to another option just because you can prove that it corresponds to the same physical process on any level that can account for difference in the experience, there's just no notion of that. When you interact with the physical, you're stuck with the same old limitations of observability. You can't gain the knowledge that's forbidden to you by being locked away from not being part of your experience by merit of the unknowable laws of correspondence between things that are experiences and things that are not.
The hard problem is a surprisingly personal one.
* What are you effortlessly sinking about?